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Abstract
The central point of this paper is the observation that attributes in Barsalou frames
are functional concepts. If Barsalou is correct in assuming that frames in his sense
constitute the universal format of human cognitive representations, the observa-
tion means that human conceptualization is entirely in terms of functional con-
cepts. This raises interest in this particular type of concept. Functional concepts
appear in natural language mainly in the form of functional nouns. This type of
noun did not get much attention in semantics. The paper therefore Vrst reviews
the notion of individual and functional nouns in formal semantics, departing from
Barbara Partee’s rising temperature puzzle. The second part turns to a general def-
inition of Barsalou frames as recursive attribute-value structures with functional
attribute and identiVes functional concepts as their basic components. It is argued
that the functional concept vocabulary is a recent development in natural language
lexica which is closely related to scientiVc evolution.
1 Introduction
It is the aim of this paper to argue that functional concepts are of fundamental
importance for semantic analysis and for cognitive theory. They are important
for semantics because they constitute a logical and grammatical type of nouns
of its own. They are important to cognitive theory because of the fundamental
role they play in categorization. Following Barsalou (1992a, 1992b), I hypothesize
that frames in Barsalou’s sense constitute the universal format of concepts in
human cognition; i. e. the universal format for the representation of arbitrary
objects and categories. Frames in the sense of Barsalou’s are recursive attribute-
value structures, similar to those used e. g. in HPSG1 and other formalisms. What
1 Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, initiated by Pollard & Sag (1994).
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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constitutes the connection between frames and functional concepts is the fact that
the attributes in Barsalou frames are functional concepts which assign values to
their arguments. If the hypothesis is correct, it follows that all representations of
objects and categories in human cognition are exclusively in terms of functional
concepts.
When I refer to “functional concepts”, I do not mean words, but cognitive
structures of representation, ultimately implemented in neuronal structures of
the brain. Languages may have lexical expressions for some of these functional
concepts, e. g. words such as English name, size, shape, color, meaning, head, bot-
tom, root, mother, or cholesterol level. But languages diUer widely in this respect.
In those languages that exhibit a rich vocabulary of terms for functional concepts,
many of these expressions are relatively young. It will be argued below that func-
tional concepts play a key role in scientiVc theory. The repertory of functional
concept terms in a language to a good deal reWects the stage of development of sci-
entiVc reasoning. This holds in particular for abstract functional concepts. Nouns
that carry the meaning of a functional concept will be referred to as “functional
nouns”. Functional concepts are not necessarily expressed by nouns. There are
also verbs that immediately express functional concepts, e. g. cost or weigh, cor-
responding to the functional nouns price and weight, respectively (for a survey
article see Gamerschlag 2014).
In the following, I will introduce the notion of functional concepts from a se-
mantic point of view, by recalling and analyzing Partee’s famous rising temper-
ature paradox (§ 2). The discussion of functional nouns will then be embedded
into the distinction of a system of four basic types of nouns, including in addi-
tion sortal, individual, and relational nouns (§ 3). In § 4, I will introduce Barsalou
frames, showing that they essentially are networks of functional assignments in
terms of attributes. This provides the crucial link between functional concepts
and frames. § 5 will brieWy discuss the role of frames, functional concepts, and
functional nouns in science. § 6 will formulate the conclusions of the discussion.
2 Partee’s paradox recalled
2.1 The temperature is rising
Montague (1973) cites an example of Barbara Partee’s that constitutes an apparent
paradox: The sentences in (1a) and (1b) do not entitle the inference of (1c).
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(1) (a) The temperature is rising.
(b) The temperature is ninety.
(c) Ninety is rising.
The example appears to contradict a fundamental law of predicate logic, ascribed
to Leibniz: If a predication P is true of an individual a, and a is identical with b,
then P is also true of b.
(2) Leibniz’ Law
P(a) a predication about some individual a
a = b identity of individuals a and b
P(b) the same predication about b
Partee’s example is not free of problems. It has been objected (cf. JackendoU
1979) that (1b) does not constitute an identity statement but rather is used to
express the location of the temperature value on a scale. According to Thomason
(1979), the predication in (1c) constitutes a category mistake.2 Also it may be
objected that the expression ninety does not refer to the same object in (1b) and
(1c). While these objections are justiVed from a linguistic point of view, they can
be avoided in several ways (cf. Löbner 1981, Löbner 1979:23f, Lasersohn 2005).
One way to save the argument intended by Partee is to consider examples such as
the following:
(3) (a) The US president will change.
(b) The US president is Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama will change.
Assume we relate these sentences to some time when Barack Obama is in oXce as
US president. Assume further that change in (3a) means ‘be replaced’3. Obviously,
(3a) and (3b) do not entail (3c) if change is taken in that meaning, which of course
is necessary if (3) is taken to represent an instance of Leibniz’ Law. In fact, it can
be argued that (3c), with that reading of change, not only does not follow from
the two premises, but in fact is semantically abnormal. A remaining problem with
2 This fact does not really show that the argument is wrong. Whether (1c) is logically possible and
does not follow from the two premises or whether the conclusion is necessarily false, or altogether
senseless – the fact remains that the entailment is invalid.
3 Single quotes are used for representing meanings and the contents of concepts.
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(3) is the fact that sentences (3a) and (3c) both have another reading with change
construed as ‘become diUerent’. With this reading of change, (3) does constitute
a valid instance of Leibniz’ Law. This problem does not arise in the German
equivalents of the three statements if change is translated as wechseln which has
the reading ‘be replaced’ but not ‘become diUerent’:
(4) (a) Der US-Präsident wird wechseln.
(b) Der US-Präsident ist Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama wird wechseln.
What is expressed in (4), and was intended in (1), is the following. The ref-
erent of the subject NP varies with the time of reference: there is a temporal
sequence of US presidents as there are temperatures varying in time. For the
nouns US-Präsident and temperature, there are functions from times to persons
and temperature values, respectively, which yield for every time the current ref-
erent of the noun. Note that for these nouns there is necessarily at most one
referent at every time and in a given context.4 In sentences like (5a,b), the NPs
refer just to the actual values at the given time of reference, and the predications
expressed by the respective VPs take these as their arguments.
(5) (a) The temperature is low.
(b) The US president is married.
Consequently, no paradox like that in (4) will arise with the sentences in (5);
consider the valid inference in (6).
(6) (a) The US president is married.
(b) The US president is Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama is married.
Crucially, the predications in (4a) and (1a) express a change in time of what
the subject refers to: the referent of der US-Präsident is replaced, as is the refer-
ent of the subject NP the temperature if the temperature rises. The Vrst premise,
therefore, is a statement of the type p(f, te) where p represents the predication
4 Uniqueness of reference here is not due to the deVnite article, but a fact inherent to the meanings of
the nouns US-Präsident and temperature. The deVnite article is redundant. See Löbner (1985) and
Löbner (2011) for the role of deVniteness marking with functional nouns.
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‘change/wechseln’ or ‘be rising’ and f represents the function from times to enti-
ties which assigns a US president, or a temperature, respectively, to every time;
te is the implicit time of reference, or evaluation time, which the statement relates
to. Roughly, (4a) says that there is a time t > te where f(t) 6= f(te); (1a) states that
f′(te) > 0, where f′ is the Vrst derivative of f with respect to t, i. e. df(t)/dt. Thus,
the content of (1a) and (4a) is a predication of the type:
(7) (a) p(f, te) where f: TIME −→ E (E some appropriate set of entities)
The second premise in (4) and (1) states that the value of f for the time of reference
te is a particular one. In (4), the second premise constitutes an identity statement,
in (1) it can at least be taken as an equivalent of an identity statement.
(7) (b) f(te) = Barack Obama
f(te) = 90°
In Leibniz’ Law, the second premise states that the argument of the predication
in the Vrst premise is identical with some object b. The two statements in (7b) are
identity statements about f(te), i. e. about theindividual that constitutes the value
of the function f for the time of reference. This, however, is not the argument
of the predication in (7a). p in (7a) has two arguments, the function f and the time
te, and the two-place predication cannot be reduced to a one-place predication
about f(te): der US-Präsident wird wechseln is not a predication that just concerns
the president of the US at time te; the analogue holds for the rising temperature
statement.
Consequently, the apparent paradox can be resolved by observing that the
second premise does not constitute a relevant identity statement for the Leibniz
entailment.
2.2 The nature of the example
Partee’s paradox is cited by Montague as an instance of an intensional subject
construction in the Vrst premise, something originally assumed not to exist (Lewis
1970). To see what an intensional construction is, let us Vrst deVne the notion of
an extensional construction. In the framework of Montague’s5, the extension
5 Montague (1973)
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of a noun is the set of its potential referents in a given context of utterance.
(Montague would talk of a possible world index instead of a context of utterance.)
For example, the extension of cow in a particular context of utterance would be
the set of all cows given in that context of utterance. The extension of US president
would be the (one and only) US president, the person in oXce, in that context. A
sentence construction is extensional with respect to a certain NP position, if the
NP can be replaced by any other NP with the same extension without changing
the truth-value of the sentence. For example, the valid entailment in (6) shows
that the sentence in (6a) (the US president is married) is extensional with respect
to the subject position: Let (6b) (the US president is Barack Obama) be true; it then
follows that the NPs the US president and Barack Obama have the same extension.
Consequently, (6c) is true because the construction NP is married is a predication
about the extension of the subject NP.
A construction is intensional, if it is not extensional. In Montague’s terminol-
ogy, the intension of an expression is a function that returns for every possible
context of utterance the extension of the expression. In the case of US president
and temperature, the intension returns the current US president and the temper-
ature, respectively, for a given context of utterance. The sentences in (1a) and
(4a) are intensional since the VP predicates about the extensions of the subject
NP at more than one time, i. e. in diUerent possible contexts of utterance. In
intensional constructions, the truth value may change, if the NP is replaced by
another NP with just the same extension. For example, if in a given context of
utterance the US president is Michelle’s husband, and the US president changes,
it does not follow that Michelle’s husband changes. Intensional constructions
represent a predication about the intension of the NP which cannot be logically
reduced to a predication about its extension (otherwise, the construction would
be extensional).
Although (1a) is clearly not extensional, Partee’s example met some opposition
as an instance of a construction with intensional subject position. Examples of
intensional (or ‘opaque’) constructions known in the historical context of the
early 1970s were sentences such as the following, with an intensional object NP:
(8) (a) Hank is seeking a unicorn.
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There are two readings to the sentence, one in which it entails (8b), and the
crucial, opaque one, in which it does not.
(8) (b) There is a unicorn that Hank is seeking.
The source of intensionality here is diUerent from the ‘rising temperature’
cases. The verb seek in its relevant reading does not express a predication about
the extension of the object NP at all. The actual extension of the object NP does
not matter. Hank may seek a unicorn even if no unicorns exist, in fact, even if
Hank does not believe in the existence of unicorns himself. The object NP renders
a description related to the intention of the seeker rather than to some object in
the world. Because of the diUerent nature of intensionality in the classical ex-
amples of the type in (8a), the rising-temperature examples were considered not
intensional proper (e. g. Dowty, Wall & Peters 1981:279-286), although the non-
extensional character manifest in the apparent failure of Leibniz’ Law was mostly
acknowledged.6
A further fundamental diUerence between the two types of intensionality con-
cerns the logical type of noun involved. The construction in (8a) is possible with
special verbs such as seek, design, imagine, expect and almost all types of nouns,
including sortal nouns, relational nouns, proper names and functional nouns (see
the next section for the distinction). The Partee example, by contrast, requires a
special type of noun for its intensional NP argument, as we will see now.
3 Types of nouns
3.1 Individual nouns and concepts
The rising-temperature, or changing-president, construction represents a predi-
cation about the changing referent of the subject NP. The meaning of the noun
must be such that it yields for every appropriate context of utterance a particu-
lar object as the unique referent. If the predication of the construction concerns
variation in time, the subject noun has to deVne a function from times to an ap-
propriate type of entities, e. g. persons or temperature values. Such nouns are of
a particular logical type. They are inherently unique. The concept they express
6 JackendoU (1979) argues for an extensional analysis of the temperature is rising; see Löbner (1981)
for a reply.
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deVnes a function that returns a unique referent to every appropriate context of
utterance.7 In former publications I therefore referred to this type of nouns as
“functional nouns”, and the corresponding type of concepts as “functional con-
cepts” (“FC1” in Löbner 1985, 1998) or “FunktionalbegriUe” in German (“FB1”
in Löbner 1979). To avoid confusion, and join established terminology, e. g. in
Janssen (1984), I will use the terms individual concept and individual noun here, as
I did in Löbner (2011). Thus temperature and US-Präsident are individual nouns,
and their meanings are individual concepts.
The subject terms of the rising-temperature or changing-president construc-
tion need not only express an individual concept that assigns referents to times.
In addition, the underlying functions must be able to return diUerent values at
diUerent times. Otherwise the predication about the temporal variation of the
value of the function would be inapplicable for logical reasons. The latter re-
quirement for the nouns in subject position is responsible for the awkwardness
of the sentences in (1c) and (4c): NPs such as ninety or Barack Obama do not have
diUerent referents at diUerent times.
The type of intensionality observed with (1a) and (4a) is also possible with
transitive verb constructions such as:
(9) (a) The coach replaced the goalkeeper.
(b) The government raised the exchange rate.
To see the diUerence between these intensional constructions and ordinary
extensional ones, consider the verb grow. If I say, for example, the sentence in
(10), I refer to a particular child now and the same child some time ago, when her
height was measured the last time.
(10) The child has grown 2 centimeters.
Contrary to predications such as wechseln in (4a), grow here requires that the
referent of the subject NP remains identical over time. It would be a joke playing
with this logical requirement if I would use (10) for a situation where the child
has been replaced by some other child which happens to be 2 cm taller than the
7 Quite generally, there will be contexts where a given inherently unique noun fails to refer; every
functional noun presupposes certain general conditions, or “appropriate context”, for successful
reference. For example, US president fails to refer if the time of reference is in the 16th century, or
husband of Amy lacks reference if Amy is not married.
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former one. The required constancy of the argument over time is what makes the
verb grow in (10) an extensional predicate term.
Not incidentally, the verb grow can also be used in the intensional construction,
similarly to rise in (1a), if the subject noun is an abstract individual noun:
(11) The gross national product grew 0.3 per cent.
The GNP is an abstract Vgure; the noun refers to whatever is the current GNP
value. If the GNP grows, the noun changes its referent. This is not true of persons,
or trees. If they grow, it is only one attribute, among many, that changes; the
growing organism remains the same organism.
The particular logical character of the constructions in (1a), (4a) and (9a,b) is
veiled by the fact that the constructions not only use the same syntax as their
extensional counterparts, but they also use the same vocabulary. First, the indi-
vidual nouns occurring here can also be used as the heads of argument terms for
extensional constructions (cf. (5a,b)); in fact they mostly are. Second, the pred-
icate terms, mostly verbs, usually have extensional uses as well, which are more
frequent, more basic and older. For example, rise can also be used extensionally as
in (12a), and wechseln as in (12b):
(12) (a) The mercury is rising.
(b) Hans wechselt auf die andere Straßenseite.
‘lit. Hans changes to the other side of the street.’
In English or German, there do not seem to be many verbs that occur exclusively
in the VP position of the rising-temperature construction. English vary and its
German equivalent variieren are among the rare examples. The existence of pairs
such as extensional the mercury is rising vs. intensional the temperature is rising,
or the extensional vs. the intensional reading of the president has changed is rather
typical.
Partee’s paradox did not have too much impact on the intensionality debate in
early formal semantics. Its importance lies in the fact that Partee came across a
linguistic construction speciVc for individual nouns. The discovery of inherently
unique nouns, and its signiVcance, was not immediately recognized. In fact,
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intensional constructions of this type were widely ignored8 and the relevance
of the subcategory of individual nouns for other constructions was not realized9.
3.2 Functional nouns and concepts
The noun temperature is used in (1) without a possessor speciVcation and given
that the example is to be interpreted out of any special context, no implicit pos-
sessor speciVcation is presupposed to be provided. In this use, temperaturemeans
‘temperature of the air’. In general, however, the notion of temperature is a re-
lational concept: temperature of some physical entity, be it a gas, a liquid or solid,
or light.10 Relational nouns like temperature – e. g. size, weight, speed, color, shape
– denote a certain conceptual dimension of some object. The object is usually
speciVed by means of a possessive construction. The whole denotes the unique
value in that dimension of the ‘possessor’ object.
Similarly, the component president of the term US president is a relational noun,
since a president, due to the underlying concept, is always the president of some-
thing, a country, some institution, society etc. In the compound US president,
the modiVer US speciVes the possessor institution. A speciVcation of a (non-
relational) possessor for some relational noun combines with the originally rela-
tional concept to form a non-relational concept – such as US_president or tem-
perature_of_the_air – which integrates the possessor concept into the relational
concept.
Nouns which are both inherently unique and relational are functional nouns.
English grammar allows for the omission of a possessor speciVcation, but if un-
speciVed the possessor has to be determined otherwise.11 There are three major
classes of functional nouns.
• Role terms for unique roles related to the possessor, where the possessor
may be a person (father), an institution (king), an event (speaker), an ob-
8 For exceptions see Janssen (1984) and Löbner (1979).
9 These other constructions include “concealed questions” (see § 1.6 below).
10 The special absolute use of the relational noun temperature is probably due to the fact that the
modern notion of temperature derived from the historical meaning ‘mixture’. The word temperature
acquired its present meaning Vrst in its application to the air (the temperature of the air was
apparently considered resulting from a mixed composition of the air).
11 There are many languages which require either an explicit possessor speciVcation or some derel-
ativizing morpheme for relational nouns. See Ortmann (to appear) for a general discussion and
examples.
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ject (inventor) etc. Examples are kinship terms for unique relatives such as
mother, father, husband, or wife (in monogamous social systems), but also
role terms for all sorts of other persons that stand in a unique relationship to
somebody (boss, best friend, landlord). Many role terms relate their referent
to an institution: terms for presidents, monarchs, and all the countless oXces
in public life.
• Terms for unique parts of the possessor play a central role in mereologies.
They include body part terms for unique body parts such as head, mouth,
stomach, or terms for parts of artefacts: handle, keyboard, mouthpiece, etc.
or physical objects in general: surface, top, tip, core etc.
• Terms for attributes (aspects, dimensions) of the possessor: terms for
scalar attributes such as size, weight, temperature, price, value, but also for
nonscalar dimensions: color, shape, meaning, name, function etc.
There are, of course, also terms for nonunique roles such as neighbor, friend,
colleague, or nonunique kinship terms: son, sister, aunt etc. Also many part-terms
denote parts that may occur more than once, for example eye, leg, bone, tooth.
These terms are all relational nouns in the narrower sense to be introduced in the
next subsection.
NPs are primarily used referentially, i. e. as argument terms of a predication, for
instance as subject or object NP. In referential use, functional and relational nouns
are in need of saturation of their open possessor argument. This constitutes what
I have called the “absoluteness constraint” on referential NPs.12 Otherwise NPs
with relational head nouns could not be interpreted in context because their ref-
erence cannot be resolved. One option of saturating the possessor argument is
by explicit speciVcation, e. g. in temperature of the air or president of the US. Al-
ternatively, the speciVcation of the possessor can, in many languages, be omitted
and left to inference from the given context.13 For example, price in (13) would
be construed as referring to the price of something which is uniquely determined
in the context:
(13) The price is rising.
12 Löbner (2011:299).
13 For further ways of dealing with an open possessor argument of functional and relational nouns
see Löbner (2011, § 5.3, § 6.2).
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If a functional noun is combined with a possessor speciVcation of the individual
concept type, the result is an individual concept.14 This follows from the fact that
functional nouns determine their referent uniquely relative to a possessor. If the
possessor itself is uniquely determined, so is the value of a functional concept for
this possessor. Thus, functional nouns may yield NPs that constitute individual
concepts. This is the case if the possessor is speciVed by means of a deVnite NP or
if an implicit unique possessor is retrieved from the context.
For this reason, it is not only individual nouns15 that enter the subject and
object positions of intensional verbs, but very often functional nouns with an
explicit or implicit unique possessor speciVcation. In fact, I assume, functional
nouns are even more frequent than individual nouns in these constructions. In
this sense, the rising-temperature construction and its transitive counterpart are
characteristic of inherently unique nouns in general, individual or functional.
(14) (a) individual noun The temperature is rising.
(b) functional noun, implicit unique possessor The price is rising.
(c) functional noun, explicit unique possessor The price of the ticket is rising.
(d) individual noun The US president will change.
(e) functional noun, implicit unique possessor The president will change.
(f) functional noun, explicit unique possessor The president of the US will change.
3.3 Sortal and relational nouns and concepts
Functional nouns are distinguished by two properties which set them apart from
ordinary common nouns: inherent uniqueness and inherent relationality. Indi-
vidual nouns are inherently unique, but not relational. Naturally, there are two
more basic types of nouns.
Relational nouns in the narrower sense are relational, but not inherently
unique. Nouns of this type include terms for potentially multiple roles such as
14 See Löbner (2011, § 4) for the compositional semantics of relational and functional nouns with
possessor speciVcations, and in particular for the “transparency property” of functional nouns
which makes them inherit the conceptual type from their possessor argument. The transparency
property is Vrst mentioned in Löbner (1998).
15 Talking of nouns rather than NPs (or DPs) here is rather sloppy, although harmless. Of course,
it is NPs (or DPs) rather than nouns that Vll the subject and object positions of the constructions
discussed. The diUerence can be neglected here, because in the examples we need to discuss, the
NPs consist of just the noun, or the noun with a possessor speciVcation, plus a deVnite article. In
the cases discussed, the nouns are inherently unique. The deVnite article is redundant under these
conditions. The whole NP then expresses the same concept as does the bare noun. (See Löbner
2011 for this account in the framework developed there.)
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brother, neighbor, friend, colleague, contemporary etc. or multiple parts of ob-
jects. There are also a large number of relational nouns derived from verbs, such
as predication, use, statement, expression and so on. Depending on the underlying
verb, deverbal relational nouns may have more than one additional argument. For
example, nominalizations from transitive verbs like discovery in discovery of X by
Y have two additional arguments.
Sortal nouns constitute the great majority of “common nouns”; they are nei-
ther inherently unique nor relational. They specify their potential referents by
means of characteristic properties. Thus they describe a sort (or category, or
kind) of objects. Since the number of objects that meet the description may hap-
pen to apply in zero, or one, or more cases, sortal nouns are not inherently unique.
Sortal nouns are very numerous; they include terms for natural kinds as well as
for classes of artefacts or any other concrete or abstract objects.
inherently unique
sortal nouns individual nouns
dog table noun water Paula pope weather
relation: – relation: –
logical type: 〈e,t〉 unary pred. term logical type: e individual term
re
la
ti
on
al relational nouns functional nouns
part brother property mother death age meaning
relation: to possessor relation: to possessor
logical type: 〈e,e,t〉 binary pred. term logical type: 〈e,e〉 unary function term
Table 1: Types of nouns
The distinction in terms of inherent uniqueness and relationality gives rise to a
system of four logical noun types (Table 1). The system is not complete as there
are types of relational and functional nouns with more than one relational argu-
ment. The type distinction corresponds to basic types distinguished in Vrst-order
predicate logic: individual nouns are of type e (individual terms), sortal nouns of
type 〈e,t〉 (one-place predicate terms), relational nouns of type 〈e,〈e,t〉〉 (two-place
predicate terms), and functional nouns of type 〈e,e〉 (one-place function terms).
As I argued in Löbner (2011:283-286), the type distinctions for nouns (in a given
lexical reading) are lexical, i. e. really inherent.
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3.4 Two characteristic constructions for individual and
functional nouns
Abstract functional nouns can be considered to correspond to attributes (or con-
ceptual dimensions) of their “possessors”, in the widest sense. For a given pos-
sessor, in a given context of utterance, the functional noun denotes the actual
value that this attribute adopts. Like the “temperature of the air”, the “price of a
barrel oil”, the “size of the pupil”, the “meaning of temperature”, “your cell-phone
number” or the “speed of the rocket”, the value of such an attribute is, or may
be, variable over time and dependent on circumstances. Consequently, languages
may provide intensional constructions such as in (1a) and (9) for the description
of the variation of the attribute values.
Abstract individual and functional nouns, with a few exceptions such as terms
meaning ‘name’, ‘shape’ or ‘color’, are comparatively young in English, German,
and other European languages. Most of them are lexical innovations of the last
three centuries. The verb vocabulary for predications about such abstract things
as temperature, weight, price, stock exchange rate, voltage etc. was recruited from
extensional-verb vocabulary. This development in lexicon and grammar is re-
sponsible for the co-existence of extensional and intensional uses of the same
verbs.16 Intensional verbs of the relevant type mostly denote movements and
similar changes in their extensional uses, while their application to things like
prices and temperature is metaphorical and/or metonymical. Not before the 18th
century, the German verb steigen ‘rise’ for upward motion could be used to form a
sentence that literally expressed ‘the temperature rises’.17 Apparently the mod-
ern construction in (15c) is built on the predecessors (15a) and (15b). (15a) is
metonymical for the change of temperature indicated. Note that the mercury
columns of traditional thermometers were vertical; it was not the whole column
of mercury that rose, rather its tip. Thus, even (15a) involves a pars pro toto
metonymy. The derived way of expression in (15b) metonymically abstracts from
the mercury column, but still the subject is not the abstract notion of temperature.
The thermometer itself, however, did not move anymore. Thus, this construction
abandons the literal meaning of steigen ‘rise’.
16 For a collection of about three hundred relevant verbs see Löbner (1979:114-124).
17 Evidence is provided by the entries in Grimm’s dictionary, Grimm (1854/1984).
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(15) (a) Das Quecksilber steigt. ‘The mercury is rising.’
(b) Das Thermometer steigt. ‘The thermometer is rising.’
(c) Die Temperatur steigt. ‘The temperature is rising.’
Variability is accompanied by uncertainty. Thus a second type of construction
deals with the possibility of diUerent alternative values for a given functional
concept. The corresponding verbs include epistemic predications like know, esti-
mate, guess, determine, be interested in, remember, tell along with other verbs that
presuppose alternatives, such as choose, inWuence, control, delimit, or constrain,
predications of evaluation: appreciate, discuss, fear, or of co-variation depend on,
follow etc.
(16) (a) Do you know the price of the download?
(b) The number of victims cannot be determined yet.
(c) The price depends on the exchange rate of the British pound.
In this type of constructions, the functional NP can be replaced by an interrog-
ative clause, e. g. Do you know what the price of the download is? For this reason,
these constructions were called “concealed questions”. Concealed question con-
structions are not restricted to abstract functional nouns.
(17) (a) Bill does not know the capital of Belgium.
(b) His mother could not be determined.
Similar to the rising-temperature construction, concealed questions borrow
their syntax from ordinary predication formats, but exploit the concept type of
individual and functional concepts for a diUerent type of predication. Löbner
(1979:129-141) contains a collection of about 1000 German verbs that can enter
the concealed question or similar constructions.18
I mention these two types of constructions – the rising-temperature type and
concealed questions – because they play a crucial role in scientiVc discourse.
There are more constructions that require functional or individual concepts. One
such construction in Russian is investigated in Partee & Borschev (2012).
18 The notion of concealed question was introduced in Baker (1968); for a survey see Nathan (2006).
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4 Frames in cognition
4.1 Barsalou’s notion of frames
Among the various notions of frames and schemata deVned and used in cognitive
psychology, artiVcial intelligence, social interaction theory, and linguistics, the
frame deVnition of Barsalou (1992a, b) is the most explicit, precise, and elaborate
deVnition of this type of structure. According to Barsalou, a frame is a concept
representation that is recursively composed out of attributes of the object to be
represented, and the values of these attributes. In addition to the speciVcation of
attributes and their values, a frame may contain various kinds of constraints that
restrict the values an attribute may adopt or deVne relations between the values
of diUerent attributes.
Barsalou represents frames with directed labeled graphs. A central node rep-
resents the object, or category of objects, which the frame represents; arcs con-
nect nodes to further nodes. In Barsalou (1992a,b), the complex consisting of
the possessor of an attribute, the attribute, and the value it adopts is graphically
represented as in Figure 1:
	 
	
 
	
Figure 1: Possessor-attribute-value complex in Barsalou (1992a, 1992b)
The arc labeled “aspect” stands for “is an aspect of”. The arc labeled “type” means
“is of type”. For example, if the three nodes in Figure 1 were taken to represent
(from left to right) a tomato, the attribute color19, and its value red, the right
arc would mean that red is of the type color. The label “type” is the same for all
value-attribute connections.
Barsalou “deVne[s] an attribute as a concept that describes an aspect of at least
some category members” (Barsalou 1992b:30). Values of attributes are deVned
as “subordinate concepts of an attribute” (Barsalou 1992b:31). This view of the
relation between value and attribute focuses on a certain aspect of the relation
between an attribute and the values it adopts. For every attribute there is the
range of values which it can possibly adopt; it constitutes a space of alternatives.
19 In this article, small caps are used for attribute terms.
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Thus, an attribute-as-function essentially corresponds to the set of values it can
adopt. In the sense of Carpenter (1992), the set of all possible values forms an
ordered hierarchy of types.
The general correspondence between attributes and sets of values has been
observed, among others, by Guarino (1992). The correspondence is reWected in
a systematic ambiguity of linguistic expressions for attributes. A noun like color
can be used both as a functional noun and as a sortal noun. This ambivalence is
systematic20. An example of the functional, attribute use of the noun would be
(18a). (18b) illustrates the sortal use; the statement is of the type represented by
the central and the right nodes in Figure 1 and the “type” link between them.
(18) (a) The color of the potato is red.
(b) Red is a color.
In (18b), the subject NP red refers just to a color as such, not to a color as a color
of something. In (18a), however, color is an inherently relational noun. I consider
the functional meaning as basic, because the sortal meaning can be easily derived
from it, but not vice versa. In his deVnition of an attribute, Barsalou relates to the
functional concept variant. But when he deVnes values as subordinate concepts
of attribute, he conceives of attributes as sortal concepts for the possible values.
Complex frame elements such as in Figure 1 can be recursively connected by
unifying a value node with another possessor node (an example is given in Figure
3 below), resulting in a subordinate speciVcation of the value by another attribute
and its value. Barsalou (1992b:33) discusses recursive attribute speciVcation in
terms of direct connections from attribute nodes to attribute nodes. For example,
he remarks that the frame for ‘vacation’ may exhibit an attribute companion
which in turn has its own attributes such as age, free time, and preferred
activities. The chain vacation – companion – age is graphically represented
as in Figure 2.
This representation, however, is a simpliVcation of the relations involved. Re-
garding the example in Figure 2, companion is an aspect, or attribute of a vaca-
tion. However, age is not an attribute of the attribute (for example, the attribute
companion is not an old or young attribute), but an attribute of the value of the
attribute companion, i. e. an attribute of the companion: the companion is of a
20 In Löbner (2011:310) I called the shift from the functional reading to the sortal reading “Guarino
shift”, relating to the observation of the underlying ambivalence in Guarino (1992).
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Figure 2: Attribute chain in Barsalou (1992a, 1992b)
certain age. Disentangling the ambiguity, the state of aUairs depicted in Figure
2 would have to be represented as in Figure 3, in order to be in accordance with
Figure 1.

	





	





  
Figure 3: Attribute chain of Figure 2 revised
Barsalou does not explicitly state what kind of relation between possessor and
value is established by an attribute. Obviously, diUerent possessors can have the
same value for a given attribute. The crucial question is, if an attribute may
relate more than one value to a possessor at the same time. If not, the attribute
constitutes a function. Implicitly, Barsalou appears to presuppose that attributes
are functions. This is evident from the choice of examples for attributes he cites as
well as from the fact that he talks of attributes “adopting values”. The very use of
the term valuewith respect to attributes would be inappropriate for nonfunctional
relations. Still, the possibility would remain that some node might have the same
attribute assigned to it more than once, e. g. two color attributes, representing an
assignment of more than one color value.21 Such a constellation, however, never
occurs in Barsalou’s frame examples.
It is therefore assumed (cf. Löbner 1998, Petersen 2007/2015) that the attributes
in Barsalou frames constitute functions (to be precise, partial functions) that re-
turn one value for every possessor of the relevant type. This basic assumption
allows a less complex way of graph representation, than the one depicted in Fig-
21 There are, of course, multicolored objects, such as the Union Jack. But the Union Jack does not
simply have the color red and at the same time the color blue and the color white. Rather, it consists
of parts of homogeneous color, and it is these parts to which their respective color attribute assigns
a value.
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ure 1. The basic unit of such graphs is a complex of two nodes, representing
the possessor and the value, connected by an arc that connects the former to the
latter. The arc represents the attribute as a function and is labeled accordingly.22

	

Figure 4: Possessor-attribute-value configuration revised
Unlike Barsalou’s frame graphs, this design implements the fundamental distinc-
tion between functions and objects23, or in this case, between attributes and val-
ues. Nodes represent objects. Attributes, being funtions and not objects, are not
represented by nodes.
Figure 5 displays a partial frame for a car, in the revised graph notation, with
similar attributes as the example frame in Barsalou (1992b:30).
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Figure 5: A frame for a car
The frame represents the values of the attributes by nodes not further spec-
iVed. The broken-line elements represent two types of constraints. “Structural
22 For a deeper and more formal treatment of the issues of Barsalou frames discussed here, see Pe-
tersen (2007/2015).
23 See (Frege 1891).
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invariants” represent constitutive relations between (the values of) attributes: the
transmission rotates the wheels; similarly, the engine rotates the transmission,
the driver operates the engine, the engine consumes the fuel. “Attribute con-
straints” capture global dependencies between the values of attributes: the greater
the capacity of the engine, the higher its performance (as well as the consumption
of fuel and the production of CO2).24
Barsalou (1992a:§ 7) assumes that frames constitute the general format of con-
cept representation, and hence of categorization, in human cognition. Frames
can be used for modeling the structure of concepts as well as what Barsalou calls
“conceptualizations”, i. e. ad-hoc modiVcations of concepts in actual contexts.
4.2 Frames and functional concepts
The fact that attributes in Barsalou frames can be considered functions that as-
sign a value to objects of appropriate type has a very important consequence:
Attributes in Barsalou frames are functional concepts. This is of utmost impor-
tance for Barsalou’s conception of categorization: We categorize exclusively
in terms of functional concepts. Functional concepts constitute the represen-
tational “vocabulary” of categorization—where the notion “vocabulary” is meant
metaphorically. It is not to be taken in the sense that cognitive categorization is
verbal. To the contrary, it is to be expected that most of the attributes used in
human cognition did not make their way as functional nouns into the lexica of
human languages. But conversel, if a language does possess functional nouns,
it may be safely assumed that they correspond to attributes in cognitive frames.
There is no other motivation for this untypical type of nouns.
There is psychological evidence that in Vrst language acquisition children as-
sign meanings to nouns that favor concrete sortal or individual concepts, while
suppressing attribute concepts: “One way children initially constrain the mean-
ings of terms is to honor the whole object assumption and thereby assume that
a novel label is likely to refer to the whole object and not to its parts, substance or
other properties.” (Markman 1990:58f). In addition to the “whole object assump-
tion”, the “taxonomic assumption” causes children to establish labels that “refer
to objects of the same kind rather than to objects that are thematically related.”
24 There are further types of constraints (cf. Barsalou 1992a:37-40); for the present purpose it is not
necessary to go deeper into the matter here.
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(Markman 1990:59) Thus relational meanings for nouns are dispreferred. This
does not mean, of course, that children are completely unable to learn relational
or functional nouns, but the two strategies mentioned clearly establish sortal and
individual nouns and the corresponding types of categorizations as the paradigm
cases. The bias against relational and functional nouns corresponds to the fact
that the referents of relational and functional nouns, for example roles, proper-
ties, and parts of objects do not exist independently; the cognitive isolation of
such aspects requires abstraction.
4.3 General properties of frames
The Vrst thing to observe about Barsalou frames is the fact that they represent
sortal concepts. The attributes they employ are functional concepts but the whole
frame is sortal: a concept that describes what it refers to in terms of certain
properties, leaving open how many, if any, objects might satisfy this kind of
characterization. A frame might contain speciVcations that narrow down the
possible number of objects that meet them to one, but there is nothing in the
structure of a frame telling that it is meant to represent exactly one object. For
example, passports contain a perfect frame description of their respective bearers;
the attributes they make use of are chosen in order to uniquely identify the bearer,
but in principle they are still sortal frames: they might happen to describe no
person at all, or exactly one person, or more than one if there happen to be two
or more persons that meet the same description.
Given this observation, it is obvious that in addition to the frames Barsalou
describes, one needs frames for types of concepts other than sortal. For relational
and functional nouns, one needs frames with empty slots for the relational ar-
guments. For individual and functional concepts, the structure of the frame must
provide for unique reference. Still, these frames too will provide a mental descrip-
tion in terms of attributes, their values and constraints and relations correlating
the values of attributes. Petersen (2007/2015) introduces frames of slightly dif-
ferent structures for the representation of relational, individual, and functional
concepts.
One of the fundamental properties of frames is their Wexibility. Frames can be
reduced or enriched, by removing or adding attributes, or by changing the speci-
Vcation of attribute values. Attributes can be bundled into complex attributes; for
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example, the attributes length and width in a rectangle frame can be combined
into size. Conversely, attributes with complex values such as color can be split
into components. A further way of combining attributes is functional composi-
tion: the attribute eye color of a person is the composition of the attribute eye
and its subattribute color.
Frames for concrete real objects are principally incomplete. A real object, such
as a person, or a tree, can never be completely described. The human mind
chooses frames of a composition, complexity, and speciVcity that are adapted
to the needs of particular situations.
4.4 Restrictions on attributes and the embodiment of frames
If frames constitute the general format of knowledge representation in the hu-
man cognitive system, the question arises as to how this format is grounded, or
embodied.25 One general aspect is the question: What does constitute a possible
attribute in human cognition? Obviously, the set of all values which an attribute
may adopt must form a natural space: the cognitive system will not employ at-
tributes which may adopt values out of an arbitrary set of entities including, say,
colors, shapes, prices, Vngers and ancestors. Rather the set of values which a
given attribute may adopt must be composed of mutually exclusive alternatives;
colors and shapes are not mutually exclusive (they can be freely combined), but
diUerent colors are. Also, it appears reasonable to maximize those spaces, mak-
ing them encompass all alternatives rather than a subclass. The completeness
requirement can be subjected to constraints in particular frames; for example the
frame of a mouse will restrict the values of the attributes size, weight, or lifes-
pan to ranges of values possible for mice. In addition, further constraints have
been proposed. In his work on conceptual spaces, Gärdenfors (2000) argues for a
general constraint that restricts the space of possible values of an attribute in a
concept to be convex: if two values are within the attribute space, then the values
between them are, too. Gärdenfors & Wargien (2012) extend the conceptual-
spaces approach to concepts for actions and events. Jäger (2012) addresses a
similar question. He applies statistical methods to the data of the World Color
Survey26 in order to investigate constraints on the composition of the extension
25 For an extensive discussion of the psychological aspects of this issue, see Barsalou (1999).
26 The WCS collects data on the use of basic color terms for a sample of 110 unwritten languages from
an average of 24 speakers each. See Cook, Kay & Regier (2005) for details.
36
Functional Concepts and Frames
of color categories. The result is largely in accordance with Gärdenfors’ convexity
conditions; there are, however, exceptions: some speakers seem to have noncon-
vex color term extensions, for example one term covering black and white, but
not the shades of grey between.
5 Frames and functional concepts in science
Frames and functional concepts play a central role in scientiVc thinking. Sciences
in general deal with particular classes of objects, e. g. physical objects, living or-
ganisms, chemical substances, languages, human subjects, works of art etc. The
objects of science are investigated in terms of their relevant attributes, where sci-
ences diUer in which attributes they address. For example, psychology, medicine,
sociology, and economics are concerned with human individuals under various
perspectives, dealing with diUerent sets of attributes of the individual.
Together, the attributes constitute the, more or less, abstract objects of a sci-
ence. For example, merely two attributes, mass and location, constitute the mass
point in physics. A chemical element is constituted by a small set of attributes,
including its atomic number. ScientiVc theorizing investigates possible values of
the attributes, possible combinations of the values of diUerent attributes, corre-
lations of values etc. These aspects are captured by diUerent types of constraint in
Barsalou’s frame theory. To give an example from linguistics, a lexeme is deVned
by a frame such as in Figure 6; general constraints would capture the correspon-
dence between phonological form and spelling of lexemes, or the dependence of
word inWection on the part of speech that a lexeme constitutes.
Attribute terms play a central role not only in scientiVc terminology, but also in
the very evolution of science. The notion of atomic number in chemistry evolved
with the theory of atomic structure, and with it today’s notion of a chemical
element. Frames can be shown to underlie the conception of scientiVc classiVca-
tions, as well as of types of processes such as chemical reactions; these underlying
frames can, in turn, be used to analyze paradigm shifts in scientiVc evolution (see
Chen & Barker 2000, Schurz & Votsis 2014).
The two typical constructions for functional nouns mentioned in § 3,4 directly
correspond to needs of scientiVc discourse. The rising-temperature construction
meets the need of being able to verbally describe changes of the values of at-
tributes and correlations between them. Concealed questions are involved in
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Figure 6: Frame for a lexeme
talk about possible values of attributes. Thus it appears plausible that abstract
functional nouns and the characteristic constructions they Vgure in emerged in
co-evolution with scientiVc theory and practice.
6 Conclusion
The discussion aimed to show that the distinction of conceptual types of nouns is
of fundamental importance for understanding not only the semantics of nouns,
but human cognition in general. Among conceptual types of nouns, functional
nouns are of particular interest. From a linguistic point of view, functional nouns
constitute a rather marginal class in grammar, as witnessed by their late emer-
gence in natural language vocabularies and, concomitantly, by the parasitic char-
acter of the constructions they are used in. In linguistic theory, too, they have
been enjoying little attention, sharing their fate of disregard with individual con-
cepts. The distinction between inherently relational and non-relational nouns
(see Table 1) is generally acknowledged. However, the fact that there are types
of nouns that are inherently unique, namely individual and functional nouns, is
rarely recognized, except for the inherent uniqueness of proper names and per-
sonal pronouns.27
27 Matushansky (2008) even denies inherent uniqueness of proper names, arguing for a sortal concept,
type 〈e,t〉, analysis.
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When Janssen titled his 1984 paper “Individual concepts are useful”, this was a
reaction to the disregard of inherently unique concepts in the development of For-
mal Semantics following Montague (1973). From the perspective of this article,
Janssen’s statement is actually an understatement. The immediate connection
between functional concepts and frames shows that functional concepts Vgure
most fundamentally in human concept formation. If Barsalou is correct in as-
suming that the basic structure of all concepts in human cognition is frames,
then functional nouns represent the type of concepts which our entire cognition
is based on. Attribute concepts, i. e. instances of functional concepts, form the
structure of the mental representations in our cognitive system: we categorize
whatever we categorize in terms of functional concepts. The relatively complex
logical type 〈e,e〉 of functional concepts is the elementary unit of concept forma-
tion, while the logically elementary type e of individuals corresponds to concepts
of unlimited complexity.
One has to assume that the mental representations of the meanings of linguis-
tic expressions are of the same structure as concepts in general. Consequently,
propositions and lexical meanings basically have the structure of frames, if Barsa-
lou is right. This observation might pave the way for a uniVed theory of decom-
position and composition that conceives of meanings as represented by frames.
Such a perspective would oUer a basis for integrating the results of formal seman-
tic research with those of cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
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